Hypersequent calculi arise by generalizing standard sequent calculi to refer to whole contexts of sequents instead of single sequents. We present a number of results using hypersequents to obtain a Gentzen-style characterization for the family of Gödel logics. We first describe analytic calculi for propositional finite and infinite-valued Gödel logics. We then show that the framework of hypersequents allows one to move straightforwardly from the propositional level to first-order as well as propositional quantification. A certain type of modalities, enhancing the expressive power of Gödel logic, is also considered.
Introduction
In this paper we survey a number of results in proof theory for Gödel logics, that have been scattered over several works of the authors. We also include some new material. Our aim is to show that a particular type of calculus -based on so-called hypersequents -is a simple but versatile tool for handling several important logics in Gentzen's spirit. Indeed, in his seminal paper on the concept of logical inference, Gentzen [44, 45] achieved -among other things -a satisfactory characterization of the relation between classical and intuitionistic proofs in terms of sequents as basic objects of derivations. In particular, the sequent calculus LJ for intuitionistic logic is defined by simply restricting the right hand side of all sequents to contain at most one formula in the sequent calculus LK for classical logic.
In the presence of the cut rule it is almost trivial to define sound and complete sequent calculi for all kinds of other logics for which a Hilbert style axiomatization is known. One can, e.g., simply extend (a suitable version of) Gentzen's calculi with additional axioms. However, it should be clear that only cut-free and therefore analytic Gentzen-style systems share the important proof theoretical properties of LJ and LK. In particular, (some form of) analyticity is a pre-condition for efficienthuman or mechanized -proof search. Consequently, a main challenge in proof theory is to extend Gentzen's celebrated results to other logics by defining appropriate calculi which enjoy cut-elimination. I.e., one should be able to show how any given derivation can be transformed into an equivalent one that does not contain applications of the cut rule.
A large range of variants and extensions of Gentzen's original sequent calculi have been introduced in the last decades to provide analytic proof systems for many types of non-classical logics. As an example, we just mention labeled systems [42] to accommodate modalities and the generalization of the (binary) sequent arrow to an n-ary relation ("many placed sequents") in order to describe analytic deduction in finite-valued logics in a uniform manner see, e.g., [60, 56, 25, 48, 19] as well as the more recent survey article [18] .
Here we deal with another natural extension of Gentzen's calculi, called hypersequent calculi. A hypersequent calculus is defined by incorporating Gentzen's original calculus (LJ, LK or a substructural version of it) as a sub-calculus and adding an additional layer of information by considering a single sequent to live in the context of finite multisets of sequents (called hypersequents). This opens the possibility to define new rules that allow to "exchange information" between different sequents. It is this type of rules which increases the expressive power of hypersequent calculi compared to ordinary sequent calculi.
To illustrate the method of hypersequents we investigate the family of (propositional and quantified) Gödel logics that is of particular interest in its own.
Propositional finite-valued Gödel logics were introduced (implicitly) by Gödel [47] to show that intuitionistic logic does not have a characteristic finite matrix. Dummett [34] later generalized these to an infinite set of truth-values, and showed that the set of its tautologies is axiomatized by intuitionistic logic extended by the linearity axiom (A ⊃ B)∨(B ⊃ A). Hence infinite-valued Gödel logic G is also called Gödel-Dummett logic or Dummett's LC.
Gödel logics naturally turn up in a number of different areas of logic and computer science. For instance, Dunn and Meyer [35] pointed out their relation to relevance logics; Visser [68] employed G in investigations of the provability logic of Heyting arithmetic; three-valued Gödel logic G 3 has been used to model strong equivalence between logic programs [53] ; and more importantly, G was recognized as one of the most important formalizations of fuzzy logic [49] .
A hypersequent calculus for G was introduced in [4] . This calculus -which we call HG -is defined by embedding Gentzen's LJ-sequents into hypersequents and by adding suitable structural rules to manipulate the additional layer of structure to the basic objects of inferences. HG will be described in Section 3.
In Section 3.2 we will present hypersequent calculi HG k for the finite-valued Gödel logics G k with k truth-values (k ≥ 2). These calculi, introduced in [30] , are simply obtained by adding one more structural rule to HG. This is done in a uniform way for all k. A new proof of the cut-elimination theorem for HG k is provided. Section 3.3 contains new results on G ∆ , i.e., Gödel logic extended by the "projection modality" ∆ of [9] (see also [65, 64] ). Indeed, by adding suitable rules to HG one obtains a hypersequent calculus for G ∆ .
Finally, in Section 4 we will show that hypersequents allow to extend analytic calculi for propositional Gödel logic to include quantifiers. In particular, we will consider two different forms of quantification: first-order quantifiers (universal and existential quantification over object variables) and propositional or "fuzzy" quantifiers (universal and existential quantification over propositions). Refining and restructuring the results contained in [20] and [24] , we shall discuss analytic hypersequent calculi for both first-order and quantified propositional Gödel logic. As we shall see, the first-order calculus allows one to prove (a suitable version of) Gentzen's mid-sequent theorem.
Hypersequent Calculi
Hypersequent calculi have been introduced in [2] and [54] . They are a natural generalization of Gentzen's sequent calculi.
We take sequents to be expressions of the form Γ ⇒ Π where Γ and Π are finite multisets of formulas [44, 59] . Hypersequent calculi do not alter the definition of a sequent at all, but just add an additional level of context to ordinary sequents.
Definition 1 A hypersequent is a multiset 1 , written as
where, for all i = 1, . . . n, Γ i ⇒ Π i is an ordinary sequent. Γ i ⇒ Π i is called a component of the hypersequent. A hypersequent is called single-conclusioned if, for every i = 1, . . . , n, Π i consists of at most one formula.
The symbol "|" is intended to denote disjunction at the meta-level. (This will be made precise in Definition 2, below.) Just as ordinary sequent calculi, hypersequent calculi consist in initial hypersequents (i.e., axioms) as well as logical and structural rules. The axioms and logical rules are essentially the same as in sequent calculi. The only difference is the presence of side hypersequents, denoted by G and G ′ , representing (possibly empty) hypersequents.
The structural rules are divided into internal and external rules. The internal structural rules deal with formulas within components. When present, they are the same as in ordinary sequent calculi (weakening and contraction). The external structural rules manipulate whole components of a hypersequent. These are external weakening (ew) and external contraction (ec) (see Table 1 ).
As an example, in Table 1 one can find a hypersequent calculus for intuitionistic logic IL which we call HIL. The "hyperlevel" of this calculus is in fact redundant, in the sense that a hypersequent Γ 1 ⇒ Π 1 | . . . | Γ k ⇒ Π k is derivable if and only if for some i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, already Γ i ⇒ Π i is derivable.
In hypersequent calculi it is possible to define additional external structural rules which simultaneously act on several components of one or more hypersequents. Below are some examples of rules of this kind (see [2, 3, 5, 27, 30] for further examples).
• As shown in [31] , by adding to HIL the following rule
Note: Henceforth we will consider single-conclusioned hypersequent calculi, i.e. containing only single-conclusioned hypersequents.
To assist a better understanding of hypersequents consider the following definitions:
Definition 2 The generic interpretation of a sequent Γ ⇒ B, denoted by Int(Γ ⇒ B), is defined by ( Γ ⊃ B * ), where Γ stands for the conjunction of the formulas in Γ or ⊤ if Γ is empty, and B * is B or ⊥ if B is empty. The generic interpretation of a hypersequent
Definition 3 A (Hyper)sequent rule is sound for a Hilbert style system sL, if whenever sL derives the generic interpretations of its premises, sL derives the generic interpretation of its conclusion too. A (hyper)sequent calculus HL is called sound for sL if all the axioms and rules of HL are sound for sL. HL is called complete for sL if for all formulas A derivable in sL, the (hyper)sequent ⇒ A is derivable in HL.
Hypersequent Calculi for Gödel logics
Gödel logics can be seen both as intermediate logics, i.e., logics including intuitionistic and included in classical logic, and as many-valued logics. On the one hand, they are characterized by the class of all rooted linearly ordered Kripke models (with at most k worlds, k ≥ 1, in the case of (k + 1)-valued Gödel logic G k+1 ), see, e.g., [41, 26] . On the other hand, their connectives can be interpreted as functions over either the
More precisely, let v I be a mapping of propositional variables into the set of truth-values. v I can be extended to formulas of Gödel logics as follows:
As usual, ¬A can be defined as A ⊃ ⊥. A formula A is a tautology iff for all v I , v I (A) = 1. Moreover A is a logical consequence of a set of formulas Γ iff, for all v I , min{v
As mentioned above, a Hilbert style calculus sG for G is obtained by adding the linearity axiom (Lin) (A ⊃ B) ∨ (B ⊃ A) to any Hilbert style calculus for IL.
For sake of concrete argumentation, we take IL to be axiomatized by the Hilbert style system sIL presented in Table 2 .
Avron's calculus HG for G ( [3] , called HLC there) is defined by extending the hypersequent calculus HIL for intuitionistic logic with the following communication rule:
3 Note that Dummett's LC was originally defined in [34] using the set of truth-values {1}∪{1− 1 n : n ≥ 1}. However, at the propositional level any infinite set of truth-values gives rise to the same set of tautologies in Gödel logic. 4 In fact, one can take any set of k + 1 real numbers from [0, 1] , that includes 0 and 1. 
Recall that this axiom is not valid in intuitionistic logic.
To prove the soundness of (propositional) hypersequent calculi we introduce the following notion:
The generic interpretation Int(r) of a (hyper)sequent rule
where Int(S i ), with i = 0, . . . , n stands for the generic interpretation of the (hyper)sequent S i (see Definition 2).
Theorem 7 HIL is sound and complete for IL.
Proof The proof is relative to the Hilbert style calculus sIL for IL.
(Soundness) We prove the stronger claim that the generic interpretation of each rule of HIL is derivable in sIL. The generic interpretation of the axioms of HIL has the form A ⊃ A and ⊥ ⊃ A, while that of the rules (ec) and (ew) is (C ∨ A ∨ A) ⊃ (C ∨ A) and (C ∨ A) ⊃ (C ∨ A ∨ B), respectively. The corresponding derivations in sIL are straightforward. Observe that the derivability in sIL of A ⊃ B implies the derivability of (A ∨ C) ⊃ (B ∨ C). Therefore we can disregard side hypersequents in proving the soundness of the rules. The soundness of the remaining rules reduces to the derivation in sIL of single formulas obtained according to Definition 2. (Completeness) Observe that Modus Ponens -the only rule of sIL -corresponds to the derivability of A, A ⊃ B ⇒ B and the cut rule. It thus suffices to show that all the axioms of sIL are derivable in HIL. This is straightforward.
⊓ ⊔ Theorem 8 HG is sound and complete for G.
Proof The proof is relative to the Hilbert style calculus sG for G.
(Soundness) In addition to Theorem 7 one has to prove that the (com) rule is sound for sG. This amounts to showing, e.g., that sG derives the generic interpretation Int − (com) of (com) without side hypersequents, i.e. the formula
where Σ stands for the conjunction of the formulas in Σ. Using I8 and I9, together with I6 and I7 we obtain
Using I1, I8 and I9, we obtain ( Γ
Finally, I10 allows us to derive Int − (com) from these formulas by "cut" with axiom (Lin).
(Completeness) Directly follows from Theorem 7 and Example 5. ⊓ ⊔
Remark 9
The rule (lq) characterizing the intermediate logic LQ (see Section 2) can be easily derived in HG using (c, l) and (com).
Remark 10
As has been shown in [14, 29] , the communication rule can be viewed as a transfer principle mapping different versions of contraction-free intuitionistic logic into their corresponding extensions containing axiom (Lin). This allowed us to define hypersequent calculi 5 for some basic (fuzzy) logics that can be considered as fragments of contraction-free G. Two particular examples of such logics are Urquhart's C -introduced in §3 of his Handbook article on many-valued logics [66, 67] -and monoidal t-norm based logic MTL [37] , the logical counterpart of left-continuous t-norms 6 and their residua [52] . Hilbert style axiomatizations for C and MTL are obtained by extending the Hilbert style system consisting of axioms {I1, . . . I3, I5, . . . , I11} of Table 2 and a Hilbert style system for aMAILL 7 , respectively, with axiom (Lin). In analogy to Avron's work on Gödel logic, analytic hypersequent calculi for C and MTL were defined in [28] and [15] by adding the communication rule to suitable contraction-free versions of HIL.
In [5] , alternative cut-free hypersequent calculi for G were introduced. These calculi are obtained by adding to HIL either the rule
or the combination of
We call the above calculi HG ′ and HG ′′ , respectively. It is not hard to see that the (com) rule is interderivable with the above rules. However, in contrast with (com), (S I ) and (com ′ ) cannot be used to define analytic calculi for contraction-free logics (see Remark 10) . Indeed, as shown in [14] , (internal) contraction is definable from either rule (S I ) or rule (com ′ ). On the other hand, HG ′ and HG ′′ lend themselves to a more natural "computational interpretation" than HG. A first step in that direction was achieved in [11] , where HG ′′ -proofs have been translated into a special natural deduction format. A different approach has been used in [38] . There, the authors show that any application of (com ′ ) corresponds to a merging of suitable parallel Lorenzen type dialogue games.
Cut-elimination
Recall that the cut-elimination method of Gentzen ([44] ) proceeds by eliminating the uppermost cut by a double induction on the complexity of the cut formula and on the sum of its left and right ranks; where the right (left) rank of a cut is the number of consecutive (hyper)sequents containing the cut formula, counting upward from the right (left) upper sequent of the cut.
In fact, in LJ, by the presence of the internal contraction rule one has to consider a derivable generalization of the cut rule, namely, the multi-cut rule (see, e.g., [62] )
where A n stands for A, . . . , A (n times). A is called multi-cut formula. Due to the presence of (ec), in hypersequent calculi (and, in particular, in HG) one cannot directly apply Gentzen's argument to show that
A simple way to overcome this problem, is to modify Gentzen's original Hauptsatz allowing to reduce certain cuts in parallel. In [3] Avron has used the following induction hypothesis ("extended multi-cut rule"):
This formulation is easily seen to be equivalent to ( * ).
We provide a version of Avron's proof for further reference.
Theorem 11 (Cut-elimination) If a hypersequent S is derivable in HG then S is derivable in HG without using the cut rule.
Proof Let γ and δ be the proofs of
We show ( * * ) by induction on the pair [c, r], where c is the complexity of the multi-cut formula (A), and r is the sum of the ranks of γ and δ. It suffices to consider the following cases according to which inference rule is being applied just before the application of the multi-cut rule: 1. either G or H is an axiom; 2. either γ or δ ends in an application of a structural rule; 3. both γ and δ end in an application of a logical rule such that the principal formula of both rules is just the multi-cut formula;
4. either γ or δ ends in an application of a logical rule whose principal formula is not the multi-cut formula.
We will give here a proof for some relevant cases. 2. Suppose that γ ends in an application of (ec), e.g.,
Applying the induction hypothesis to both δ and γ 1 one obtains a proof of
The desired result is obtained by several applications of (c, l).
Suppose that δ ends in an application of (ec), e.g.,
Applying the induction hypothesis to both γ and δ 1 one obtains a proof of
. . , Γ n . Hence the claim follows by applying the (ec) rule.
γ or δ ends in another structural inference: These cases are unproblematic applications of the induction hypothesis to the premises followed by applications of structural inferences. E.g., suppose that δ ends in an application of (com), e.g.,
where H 1 and
Applying the induction hypothesis to γ and δ 1 as well as to γ and δ 2 one obtains
is obtained by applying (com) and (ec). 3. We first apply the induction hypothesis to the premises (based on the reduced r first, and on the reduced c then). The claim follows by applications of appropriate logical and structural inferences. (See [3] ).
4. This case is easily handled by appeal to the induction hypothesis and applications of appropriate logical and structural inferences. We outline the only non-trivial case, i.e., when γ ends in an application of (∨, l), e.g.,
Applying the induction hypothesis to both γ 1 and δ as well as to γ 2 and δ one obtains the proofs of
follows by several applications of (w, l) and the following lemma.
⊓ ⊔
Lemma 12
The following generalized rule
is cut-free derivable in HG.
Proof For n = 1, the claim follows by applying (∨, l). Otherwise, using only (ec) and (com) one can derive
Γ n ⇒ C n from the premises of (∨, l). Hence by applying (∨, l) (together with (ec) as necessary) one
The desired result follows by iteratively applying the above argument to (a) and (b).
Remark 13 Maehara's lemma (see [62] ) cannot be established for cut-free derivations in hypersequent calculi with (ec) and (com). It is however possible to construct interpolants for G directly by the elimination of propositional quantifiers in quantified propositional Gödel logic over [0, 1] (see Section 4.2).
Finite-valued Gödel logics
In this section we present cut-free hypersequent calculi for finite-valued Gödel logics. These calculi are obtained by simply adding one more structural rule to the hypersequent calculus for intuitionistic logic.
Recall that a Hilbert style axiomatization sG k+1 for G k+1 is obtained by extending the one of G with the axiom (Lin k+1 )
Let us consider the following rule
In [30] it was shown that extending HIL with the above rule results in a cut-free calculus for the intermediate logics Bc k+1 (with k ≥ 1) which are semantically characterized by Kripke models with at most k worlds. As mentioned above, G k+1 can be characterized also by linearly ordered Kripke models with at most k worlds. Therefore, one way to define a hypersequent calculus for G k+1 is simply to add the rule (Bc k+1 ) to the HG calculus for G.
An alternative cut-free calculus for G k+1 (called HG k+1 ) was defined in [30] by adding to HIL the following rule
It is not hard to see that both rules (com) and (Bc k+1 ) are derivable in HG k+1 .
Theorem 14 ([30]
) HG k+1 is sound and complete for G k+1 .
Proof The proof is relative to the Hilbert style calculus sG k+1 . It is not difficult to show that the rule (G k+1 ) is sound for sG k+1 and that HG k+1 derives axiom (Lin k+1 ). Therefore the claim follows from Theorem 8.
⊓ ⊔
Remark 15 HG 2 is a single-conclusioned hypersequent calculus for classical logic (see [31, 6] ).
Theorem 16 (Cut-elimination) If a hypersequent S is derivable in HG k+1 then S is derivable in HG k+1 without using the cut rule.
Proof We show that if both the hypersequents
. . , Γ n . Let γ and δ be the proofs of G and H, respectively.
In addition to the proof of Theorem 11 we have to consider cases involving the rule (G k+1 ). We will give here a proof for some relevant cases. Suppose δ ends in an application of such a rule, e.g.,
Applying the induction hypothesis to γ and δ i (i = 1, . . . , k) one obtains a proof δ
, where Γ is Γ 1 , . . . , Γ n . Hence the desired result
Suppose γ ends in an application of (G k+1 ). We outline below the two cases: in (G k+1 ), more than one component of G is not a side hypersequent and only one component of G is not a side hypersequent. In the former case, assume, e.g., γ ends as follows
Applying the induction hypothesis to δ and, e.g., γ 1 one obtains a proof of
. . , Γ l follows by several applications of (ew) and (w, l). In the latter case, suppose, e.g., γ ends as follows
Applying the induction hypothesis to δ and γ 1 one obtains a proof of
by s applications of (G k+1 ) together with (ec) as necessary.
Remark 17
In [30] the above proof was formulated without using the "extended multi-cut rule". However, as pointed out by Avron, in hypersequent calculi, Gentzen's argument works only if one can suitably trace the cut formula over the proof. (See, e.g., the "history technique" used in [2] or the notion of "decoration" of formulas introduced in [10] ).
Gödel logic with 0-1 projections
In [9] , Gödel logic extended by the "projection modalities" ▽ and ∆ has been investigated:
Whereas ▽A can be already defined in G as A ⊃ ⊥, the extension including ∆ -called G ∆ -is strictly more expressive.
Remark 18
The ∆ operator is called globalization (and denoted by ⊓ ⊔) in [65, 64] .
A Hilbert calculus sG ∆ for G ∆ was defined in [9] , extending the calculus for G by Note that axioms (∆ 1) − (∆ 3) and (∆ rule) are the modal axioms of the logic S4 and its necessitation rule, respectively. To obtain a hypersequent calculus for G ∆ we first extend HG with the following rules for introducing ∆
where ∆Γ denotes any set of ∆-formulas, i.e. formulas of G ∆ prefixed by ∆. The above two rules correspond to the S4-rules for ∆ (see, e.g., [40] ). However, they do not suffice to establish that ∆-formulas behave like boolean formulas. In particular, axiom (∆ 4) is not derivable. To this aim, we consider the additional rule
We call the resulting calculus HG ∆ .
Remark 19
By replacing ∆Γ with Γ in (cl ∆ , l), one obtains the rule (G 2 ) defining a single-conclusioned calculus for classical logic (see Remark 15) .
where ∆Γ abbreviates ∆A 1 ∧ . . . ∧ ∆A n , is derivable in sG ∆ .
Theorem 21 HG ∆ is sound and complete for G ∆ .
Proof The proof is relative to the Hilbert style calculus sG ∆ . (Soundness) Proceeds as in Theorem 8. Proving the soundness of the rules (∆, l) and (∆, r) is straightforward. To show that (cl ∆ , l) is sound for sG ∆ one can prove that sG ∆ derives the generic interpretation Int − (∆, r) of (∆, r) without side hypersequents, i.e. the formula
where ∆Γ stands for ∆A 1 ∧ . . . ∧ ∆A n . This follows by the derivability in sG ∆ of
together with Lemma 20 and axiom (∆ 4). (Completeness) (∆ rule) is a particular case of the rule (∆, r). By Theorem 8 it suffices to prove that HG ∆ derives (∆ i) with i = 1, . . . , 5. We display the proofs of axioms (∆ 4) and (∆ 5) in HG ∆ :
Before proving the cut-elimination theorem for HG ∆ , observe that one cannot directly shift the (cut) rule upward over (cl ∆ , l), e.g., in the case below:
A way to solve this problem is to consider the following cut rule over ∆-formulas as cut formulas
Lemma 22 The rules (cut ∆ ) and (cut) with a ∆-formula as cut formula are interderivable in HG ∆ .
Proof On the one hand, (cut ∆ ) allows one to derive (cut). The derivation proceeds as follows
On the other hand, (cut ∆ ) is derivable in HG ∆ using (cut):
Let HG ′ ∆ be the calculus obtained from HG ∆ by replacing the (cut) rule with both (cut ∆ ) and
where X is not a ∆-formula. ((cut ′ ) and (cut ∆ )) is similar to the proof of Theorem 11. Indeed, we will show that if both the hypersequents
It is easy to see that (⋆) and (⋆⋆) are derivable generalizations of the rules (cut ′ ) and (cut ∆ ), respectively.
The proof proceeds by induction on the pair [c, r] according to the 4 cases indicated in the proof of Theorem 11. We will give here a proof for some relevant cases. Let γ and δ be the proofs of G and H, respectively.
1. If H (resp. G) is an axiom, by Lemma 24 the desired hypersequent is just G (resp. H).
We will present here some examples for cases 2 and 3 involving ∆-formulas (or formulas with ∆-subformulas) as multi-cut formulas.
2. Suppose that γ ends in an application of (cl ∆ , l), e.g.,
and G is G ′ | Γ ⇒ ∆A. By applying the induction hypothesis to δ and γ 1 one gets
3. Suppose that δ and γ end as follows
Applying the induction hypothesis to γ 1 and δ 2 one obtains a proof γ
Applying the induction hypothesis again, based on the reduced complexity of the multi-cut formula, to γ ′ 1 and δ 1 , one obtains a proof of
follows by several applications of (w, l) and (ec).
For ∆-formulas, case 3 can only occur when both γ and δ end in an application of a introduction rule for ∆. Suppose, e.g., that γ and δ end as follows
By applying the inductive hypothesis to δ 1 and γ 1 one obtains a proof of the hypersequent
It is easy to check that the claim is true when either γ or δ ends in an application of a logical rule whose principal formula is not the multi-cut formula.
Remark 26
In order to eliminate cuts in proofs containing non atomic axioms (e.g., in the case in which H is the axiom ∆A ⇒ ∆A and G is G ′ | Γ ⇒ ∆A) one would need in HG ∆ the following additional rule, which is sound for G ∆ :
Quantifiers in Gödel Logic
In [20, 24] extensions of analytic calculi for propositional Gödel logic with quantifiers were presented. In particular, two different forms of quantification have been investigated: first-order quantifiers (universal and existential quantification over object variables) and propositional or "fuzzy" quantifiers (universal and existential quantification over propositions).
As already mentioned before, if we consider the set of tautologies, there is only one 8 infinite-valued propositional Gödel logic. In contrast, different first-order and quantified propositional Gödel logics are induced by different infinite subsets of truthvalues over [0, 1] (closed under infima and suprema) [22] . As an example, consider the first-order Gödel logics based on the truth-value sets:
n ≥ 1} and V ↑ = {1} ∪ {1 − 1 n : n ≥ 1}, respectively. The one based on V ∞ (i.e. the "standard" Gödel logic when viewed as a fuzzy logic [49] ) is axiomatizable, while those based on V ↑ and V ↓ are not [55] . Moreover, the first-order Gödel logic based on V ↑ turns out to be the intersection of all finite-valued first-order Gödel logics [22] . (See [32, 33] for alternative axiomatizable first-order extensions of G which are defined not via their many-valued semantics but as the class of formulas valid in all linearly ordered Kripke models.)
A similar situation holds for propositionally quantified Gödel logics as shown in [22, 16] .
Another feature that makes quantified Gödel logics conceptually interesting is the role of the so-called Takeuti-Titani "density rule",
where p is a propositional eigenvariable (i.e., it does not occur in the conclusion). This rule, expressing the density of the ordered set of truth-values, was used in [63] to axiomatize first-order Gödel logic based on the set of truth-values [0, 1] (called "intuitionistic fuzzy logic" IF there). Takano [61] has later shown that this rule is in fact redundant in the calculus by referring to semantical arguments already present in Horn [50] . The situation for Gödel logic with propositional quantifiers is different.
Here, in contrast to IF, an instance of the Takeuti-Titani rule is essential to obtain a complete (Hilbert style) axiomatization for quantified propositional Gödel logic based on [0, 1], as was shown in [22] . (The reason is that whereas first-order Gödel logic based on [0, 1] turns out to be the intersection of all first-order Gödel logics, the intersection of all quantified propositional Gödel logics is not even a Gödel logic at all, see [22, 55] .) Henceforth we only deal with Gödel logic in which the full real interval [0, 1] serves as set of truth-values.
Based on results from [24] , in Section 4.1 below we show that Avron's HG calculus can be suitably extended to a cut-free hypersequent calculus for first-order Gödel logic for which applications of the Takeuti-Titani rule are (syntactically) eliminable from all derivations. Moreover, for this calculus the mid-hypersequent theorem holds. Along the lines of [20] we present, in Section 4.2, a cut-free hypersequent calculus for quantified propositional Gödel logic and characterize a non-trivial fragment for which the Takeuti-Titani rule is eliminable.
First-order Gödel logic
The language of first-order Gödel logic is identical to that of classical logic (or intuitionistic logic, for that matter). Free and bound (object) variables are distinguished syntactically using a as meta-variable for the former and x for the latter. Propositional variables are identified with predicate symbols of arity 0 and are denoted with p. Generalizing the many-valued semantics of G to the first-order level is straightforward: An interpretation I consists of a non-empty domain D and a valuation function v I that maps constants and object variables to elements of D and n-ary function symbols to functions from D n into D. v I thus extends in the usual way to a function mapping all terms of the language to an element of the domain. Moreover, v I maps every n-ary predicate symbol P to a function from D n into [0, 1]. The truth-value of an atomic formula A := P (t 1 , . . . , t n ) is defined as
The semantics of propositional connectives remains unchanged. We call distribution of A(x), the set Distr I (A(x)) = {v I (A(p)) | p ∈ D}. The quantifiers are, as usual, defined as infimum and supremum of their distributions, i.e.
I satisfies a formula A iff v I (A) = 1. A is valid iff it is satisfied by every interpretation. First-order Gödel logic is also characterized by the class of all rooted linearly ordered Kripke models with constant domains.
A Hilbert style calculus for first-order Gödel logic -which we call sIF -is obtained by extending the one for first-order IL by axioms (Lin) and the "law of quantifiers shifting" (∨∀) ∀x(A(x) ∨ B) ⊃ (∀xA(x) ∨ B), where x does not occur in B (see [50, 61] ).
In [24] a hypersequent calculus HIF 9 for first-order Gödel logic was defined. It amounts to HG extended by the following quantifier rules: axiom (∨∀):
As already mentioned before, the Takeuti-Titani rule is redundant in an appropriate calculus for first-order Gödel logic. In [61] , Takano posed the question whether a syntactical elimination of this rule is also possible. HIF allows one to give a positive answer to this question. Indeed, let us consider the following version of Takeuti and Titani's density rule
where the propositional variable p must not occur in the lower hypersequent.
Theorem 28 ([24] ) Any derivation of a hypersequent S in HIF augmented by (tt) can be transformed into a derivation of S in HIF.
This follows by induction on the number of applications of (tt) using the following lemma.
Lemma 29
If π is an HIF-derivation of
where p does not occur in G, Φ i and Ψ j and if Π j ⊆ {p} (for i = 1, . . . , n and j = 1, . . . , m), then there is an HIF-derivation of
Proof By induction on the length of π. We distinguish cases according to the last inference I in π. As an example, consider the case in which I is (⊃, l) and its premises are, say,
Let Φ = Φ 1 , . . . , Φ n . The induction hypothesis provides us with
We obtain the desired hypersequent by applying (⊃, l) successively m times, together with some applications of (w, l) and (ec). ⊓ ⊔
Lemma 30
is cut-free derivable in HIF.
Proof For n = 1, the claim follows by applying the (∃, l) rule. Otherwise, using only (∃, l), (com) and (ec), we can derive ( * ) G | ∃xA(x),
where b is a new variable. The derivation of the hypersequent ( * ) is then as follows (we omit contexts that are not involved in the derivation)
∃xA(x), Γ1 ⇒ C1 | H with i = 3, . . . , k. The desired result follows by iteratively applying the above argument to ( * ).
⊓ ⊔
As shown in [10] , using the above lemma one can prove
Proof The proof proceeds as in the classical case (see, e.g., [62] ). First observe that all non-atomic axioms are cut-free derivable from atomic axioms. Recall that the only case that does not work for LJ arises when π contains a quantifier inference above a (∨, l) inference. In HIF the (∨, l) rule can be simulated without using cuts by the following one
We replace all the applications of (∨, l) by applications of (∨ ′ , l) in π. We define the order of a quantifier inference in π to be the number of propositional inferences under it, and the order of π as the sum of the orders of its quantifier inferences. The proof then proceeds by induction on the order of π.
The above theorem can be used to prove Herbrand's theorem for the prenex fragment of Gödel logic. (See [12] for a semantical proof of the latter theorem).
Quantified propositional Gödel logic
An interesting generalization of propositional Gödel logic is obtained by adding quantifiers over propositional variables. In contrast to classical logic, propositional quantification may increase the expressive power of Gödel logic. More precisely, statements about the topological structure of the set of truth-values (taken as infinite subsets of the real interval [0, 1]) can be only expressed using propositional quantifiers [22] .
There is yet another reason that renders the investigation of quantified propositional Gödel logic interesting, namely its relation with the interpolation property (see [21] ). Indeed, Gödel logic admits elimination of propositional quantifiers which yields an immediate proof of the uniform interpolation property (Corollary 38). Henceforth let us use the notation A[X] to exhibit the occurrences of the formula X in the formula A.
In . In other words, propositional quantification is semantically defined by the supremum and infimum, respectively, of truth functions (with respect to the usual ordering "0 < 1" over the classical truth-values {0, 1}). This correspondence can be extended to Gödel logic by using propositional quantifiers. Syntactically, this means that we allow formulas (∀q)A and (∃q)A for propositional variables in the language. Again we distinguish free and bound variables syntactically by using a to denote free variables and q to denote bound variables.
The semantics of propositional quantifiers is defined analogously to that of firstorder quantifiers as the infimum and supremum of the corresponding distribution. In this context the distribution of
To obtain a Hilbert style calculus for quantified propositional logic, we first add to the axiom system for IL of Table 2 where a does not occur in Y .
Remark 35 Implies-∃, ∀-Implies as well as (R∃) and (R∀) are already sound for intuitionistic logic with propositional quantifiers.
The system sQG for quantified propositional Gödel logic is obtained by taking all abovementioned axioms and rules plus the following two axioms: where q does not occur in A and q ′ occurs neither in A nor in B.
Theorem 36 ([22] ) sQG admits quantifiers elimination: For every formula A there exists a quantifier-free formula B, all whose variables are in A, such that sQG derives (A ⊃ B) ∧ (B ⊃ A).
Corollary 37 sQG is sound and complete for quantified propositional Gödel logic.
Corollary 38 G admits uniform interpolation: For every tautology P ⊃ Q of G there exists a formula C, depending only on P and on the propositional variables of P not occurring in Q, such that P ⊃ C and C ⊃ Q are tautologies of G. 
Remark 39
In fact, it was proved in [22] that instances of axioms Implies−∃ and ∀−Implies, where the formulas denoted by X are quantifier free, suffice for the completeness of the calculus.
The hypersequent calculus HQG for quantified propositional Gödel logic is obtained by augmenting HG with both the density rule (tt) and the following rules for introducing propositional quantifiers:
Theorem 42 ( [20] ) Every HQG − -proof π of a hypersequent H can be transformed into a proof π ′ of H in which no application of the density rule occurs.
Proof The proof is similar to that of Theorem 28.
Remark 43 Due to the eigenvariable condition in (tt), one cannot permute this rule with (∀, l) 0 (or (∃, r) 0 ) as, e.g., in the derivation of the density axiom (see the proof of Theorem 40).
Conclusion
The literature contains various analytic calculi for G, see, e.g., [58, 1, 36, 17, 43, 7, 12, 39] . Among them, several calculi are better suited for proof search than hypersequent calculi. This holds in particular for sequent of relations calculi [17, 13] , goal-oriented proof procedures [43] , the systems recently defined in [7, 8, 39] or the resolution-style chaining calculi used in [12] . However, the mentioned calculi cannot be modified in a simple way to include quantifiers, modalities or to formalize related logics.
The most significant feature of the calculus HG is its close relation to Gentzen's sequent calculus LJ for intuitionistic logic. HG contains LJ as a sub-calculus and simply adds an additional layer of information by allowing LJ-sequents to live in the context of finite multisets of sequents; suitable structural rules allow to manipulate sequents with respect to their contexts. This design provides a rather flexible framework that allows one to formulate analytic Gentzen-style calculi for a range of logics that bear a similar relation to contraction-free versions of intuitionistic logic as G bears to IL (e.g., Urquart's C [66, 67] or Esteva and Godo's MTL [37] ). In addition, suitable rules for dealing with the ∆ modality, as well as for bounding the number of possible truth-values in Gödel logics, can be naturally defined. Moreover, one can easily go beyond the propositional level by adding the usual quantifier rules (both for first-order and propositional quantifiers). Remarkably enough, in the resulting calculus for first-order Gödel logic one can prove (a version of) Gentzen's classical mid-sequent theorem. This should be contrasted with the fact that no comparable version of this theorem holds for intuitionistic logic. In this sense, the external level of HG captures some "classical" features of G.
Finally, we remark that in (cut-free) hypersequent calculi the subformula property is retained in its original form. This makes them a nice tool for analyzing and reasoning about proofs in the logics concerned.
